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Abstract 
The United States has used tax credit and mandate to promote ethanol production.  To offset the 
tax credit availed by the imported ethanol, the United States instituted an import tariff.  This 
study ascertains the appropriate U.S. ethanol import tariff corresponding to the U.S. domestic 
policies by setting the policy-induced ethanol price equal to the free market price.  The 
theoretical results from a horizontally-related ethanol-gasoline partial equilibrium model of three 
countries (the United States, Brazil, and the Rest of the World) show that the United States 
should provide an import subsidy rather than impose a tariff.  The empirical results quantify that 
this import subsidy is $0.10, instead of a $0.57 import tariff, per gallon of ethanol. 
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Introduction 
The United States and Brazil are the world’s largest ethanol producers, accounting for 89% of 
the total world production in 2008.  The U.S. ethanol output of 9 billion gallons in 2008 is the 
largest worldwide, followed by Brazil with 6.5 billion gallons (Renewable Fuels Association 
(RFA), 2009).  Currently, corn is the major feedstock for ethanol production in the United States 
and sugarcane in Brazil.  The U.S. government has promoted ethanol production through several 
policies: tax credit, mandate, and import tariff.
1  The tax credit is a subsidy given to blenders of 
ethanol and gasoline.  Currently, the tax credit is set at $0.46 per gallon of ethanol under the 
2008 Farm Bill.  The mandate requires blenders to use a specified volume of biofuel to blend 
with gasoline.  The mandated volume for 2008 is 9 billion gallons and is set to increase to 36 
billion in 2022 (RFA, 2009).  Although the tax credit was meant only for domestically produced 
ethanol, it also applies to imported ethanol because blenders cannot distinguish the origins of 
ethanol.  Consequently, to offset the tax credit availed by the imported ethanol, the U.S. 
government instituted an import tariff.  The United States justifies the ethanol import tariff by 
claiming that since imports receive the benefits of U.S. tax credit,
2 the tariff is needed to negate 
these benefits, and elimination of the tariff will hurt the domestic ethanol industry (RFA, 2007).  
Furthermore, the tariff is permissible because U.S. tariffs on ethanol have not been contested in 
the Uruguay Round (Motaal, 2008), and tariffs may not face a steeper cut even if there is an 
agreement reached under the Doha Round (de Gorter and Just, 2008).   
Currently, the U.S. import tariff on ethanol is $0.57 per gallon, which includes a $0.54 
specific tariff and 2.5% ad valorem tariff (de Gorter, Just, and Tan, 2009).  As a result, the 
import tariff is higher than the tax credit by 11 cents per gallon of ethanol.  Recent studies have 2 
 
shown that the U.S. tariff restricts the amount of ethanol imports from Brazil even though Brazil 
continues to have a significant comparative advantage in ethanol production (Elobeid and 
Tokgoz, 2006 and 2008; Kojima, Mitchell, and Ward, 2007).  The United States imported, in 
2008, about 434 million gallons from Brazil, which is only 6.8% Brazilian production (RFA, 
2009).  Consequently, Brazil is considering filing a formal complaint at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) against the U.S. ethanol tariffs (Klapper, 2008).  This dispute has become 
even more complex because the WTO has not formulated rules to address biofuel subsidies and 
tariffs as policies related to energy products are largely exempted from the WTO regulations and 
lack of clarity on whether biofuel is an agricultural good or industrial good (Motaal, 2008; 
Howse, van Bork and Hebebrand, 2006). 
As this dispute is unresolved, it is worth ascertaining the appropriate U.S. ethanol import 
tariff given the U.S. tax credit and mandate.  Specifically, this study aims to determine the value 
of tariff corresponding to the U.S. domestic policies by setting the policy-induced ethanol price 
equal to the free market price.  Our results show that the current U.S. tariff, which is 11 cents 
more than the tax credit, is punitive to Brazil, and the United States should provide an import 
subsidy rather than impose an import tariff.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  
The next section describes the theoretical model, analysis, and the results.  Section III presents 
information related to parameters, data, and sources.  Section IV discusses the empirical results.  
The final section provides concluding remarks and policy implications. 
Theoretical Framework 
A horizontally-related ethanol-gasoline partial equilibrium model of three countries (the United 
States, Brazil, and the Rest of the World) is formulated.
3  The United States produces and utilizes 
both fossil fuel (gasoline) and ethanol.  Since the United States is the largest user of fuel, its 3 
 
demand for fossil fuel and ethanol exceeds supply, and thus is an importer of both fuels.  The 
United States imports fossil fuels from the Rest of the World (ROW) oil producing countries, 
and U.S. excess demand equals ROW excess supply: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
UU UU RR RR
GG GG GG GG DP SP SP DP −=−,                   (1) 
where 
U
G D  is the U.S. demand for gasoline, 
U
G S  is the U.S. supply of gasoline, 
R
G S  is the ROW 
supply of gasoline, 
R
G D  is the ROW demand for gasoline, 
U
G P  is the U.S. price of gasoline, and
R
G P  is the ROW price of gasoline.  The spatial price arbitrage between U.S. and ROW gasoline 
prices is given by:  
UR
G GG P PT = + ,                                         (2) 
where  TG  is the transport cost of gasoline between the ROW and the United States.  The United 
States imports ethanol from Brazil, and U.S. excess demand equals Brazil’s excess supply:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,, −= −
UU C UU P BB BB
EE EE EE EE DP SP SP DP,                            (3) 
where 
U
E D  is the U.S. demand for ethanol, 
U
E S  is the U.S. supply of ethanol, 
B
E S  is the Brazilian 
supply of ethanol, 
B
E D  is the Brazilian demand for ethanol, 
, UC
E P  is the U.S. consumer/demand 
price of ethanol, 
, UP
E P  is the U.S. producer/supply price of ethanol, and
B
E P  is the Brazilian price 
of ethanol.  The United States imposes tariff ( ) t on ethanol imports from Brazil, and the price-
linkage equation is  
, , = ++
UP B
EE E P P tT                                         (4) 
where E T is the cost of transportation of ethanol from Brazil to the United States.  The United 4 
 
States provides tax credit ( ) s  to the blenders for blending ethanol and gasoline.  This tax credit 
causes a wedge between producer and consumer/blender ethanol prices: 
,, .
UC UP
EE PPs = −                          (5)  
The United States mandates a fixed volume of ethanol to be blended with gasoline under 
the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007.  For instance, 9 billion gallons of renewable fuel were required to be blended with gasoline 
in 2008, and this requirement will continue to increase to 36 billion gallons by 2022.  Even 
though this Act requires a fixed volume of biofuel to be mixed with gasoline, i.e., consumption 
mandate, the Environmental Protection Agency, which is responsible for implementing the RFS, 
requires that ethanol and gasoline are to be mixed in a fixed proportion (m), i.e., blend mandate.  
This blend mandate implies that the share of ethanol (gasoline) in the final fuel is m (1-m):  
( ) and 1 ,
UUU U
EFG F D mD D m D = = −                      (6)  
where 
U
F D  is the U.S. demand for final fuel.  Thus,  
( ) 1 = + = +−
UUU U U
F EG F F D D D mD m D
.             
Since final fuel is a weighted average of ethanol and gasoline, the producer price of final 
fuel ( )
, UP




FE G P mP m P = +−               
The United States imposes excise tax ( ) F t  on final fuel, which causes the wedge between 
consumer and producer price: 
   P F
U,C = P F
U,P + tF .                   





F E GF P mP m P t = +− +                      (7) 
Substitution of the equation (5) into (7) leads to  
( ) ( )
,, 1.
UC UP U
F E GF P mP s mP t = −+− +                     (8) 
Substitution of equations (2), (4), (6), and (8) into the gasoline and ethanol trade equilibrium 
equations (1) and (3) and rearrangements yield
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, 11
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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F E G F EE EE E EE E m Dm P s m P t S P S P tT DP tT − + − + = + −− − −−      (10) 
The above system of two equations in two unknowns ( )
, and 
UP U
EG PP is the core equations used for 
the analysis below.  If the specific functional forms of supply and demand are known, equations 
(9) and (10) can be solved for equilibrium U.S. ethanol and gasoline price.  This equilibrium 
price can be substituted into the supply, demand, and price linkage equation to obtain other 
prices and quantities.  Similarly, the equilibrium prices and quantities under free trade can be 
solved.  By equating ethanol prices under distortive policies to free trade ethanol price, we can 
compute the tariff corresponding to the U.S. ethanol policies.   
  However, when the supply and demand functions are in general forms, it is not possible 
to solve the system of two equations explicitly for endogenous variables.  In this case, the trade 
equilibrium conditions (9) and (10) need to be differentiated to compute the appropriate tariff 




EE P P ts = •  .  The tariff (t) corresponding to the tax credit for domestic and imported 
ethanol should be such that ( )
,, ;, ,
UP UP
EE P ts P •=  the free trade price of ethanol in the United 
States.  Thus, the problem is to find t for a given level of subsidy s such that the U.S. ethanol 6 
 
producer price after the subsidy and tariff is the same as the free market ethanol price.  Taking 





around the free market policies ( ) 0 = = ts  
and making use of  ( )
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where  ( ) ( )
,, // / φ = − ∂∂ ∂∂
UP UP
EE Ps Pt is the countervailing coefficient that (i.e., the ratio of t to s) 
determines the magnitude of the specific tariff resulting from one unit of production tax credit. 
The countervailing coefficient φcan be solved by conducting a comparative static 
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we can decipher from (12) and from the definition of 
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The terms on the right hand side of the above equations are converted into elasticities by 
multiplying and dividing (price/quantity) and using the identities ( ) 1
UU
FG mD D −=  and
 mDF
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whereε
U
GG is gasoline supply elasticity in the United States,ε
R
GG is gasoline supply elasticity in the 
ROW,η
R
GG is gasoline demand elasticity in the ROW,η
U
FF is the fuel demand elasticity in the 
United States,ε
B
EE is ethanol supply elasticity in Brazil, andη
B
EE is ethanol demand elasticity in 
Brazil.  For positively sloped supply( ) ,, 0
URB
GG GG EE εεε ≥and negatively sloped demand
( ) ,, 0
URB
FF GG EE ηη η≤ , we can ascertain from (13) that φis negative, and thus, from (11), t is also 
negative.  This result implies that the U.S. should be providing an import subsidy rather than 
imposing the import tariff to maintain the policy-distorted U.S. ethanol producer price at the free 
market price.  The rationale for this result is that the U.S. ethanol tax credit props up the U.S. 
producer price artificially; if this price were to come down to free market level, ethanol supply 
would also need to increase.  However, domestic production will decline because of falling 
producer price.  Hence, the only way to expand total ethanol supply is to increase imports, which 
can be accomplished by subsidizing imports, not taxing imports.   
Though the sign of the countervailing coefficientφis readily determined as negative, the 
magnitude ofφis not easily ascertainable.  However, we can ascertain the effects of the 
magnitude of parameters onφby conducting comparative statics, i.e., differentiating φwith the 
respect to various parameters.  Note that in this analysis,φand demand elasticities (, η
U




and  ) η
U
FF are negatives.   / 0,
U
GG ∂φ ∂ε < / 0,
R
GG ∂φ ∂ε < and  /0
U
GG ∂φ ∂η > : the more elastic the 
gasoline supply in the United States and the ROW and the gasoline demand in the ROW, the 
larger the import subsidy.   /0
B
EE ∂φ ∂ε > and  /0
B
EE ∂φ ∂η < : the more elastic the Brazilian ethanol 
supply and demand, the smaller the import subsidies.   /0
U
FF ∂φ ∂η > : the more elastic the U.S. 
fuel demand, the larger the import subsidy.  /0 m ∂φ ∂ < : as m increases, the import subsidy also 
increases.  In addition, the range of values that φcould take can be determined by conducting 
sensitivity analysis for small and large values of the parameters, which we examine in the 
empirical analyses. 
  If only the single sector model, i.e., only the ethanol market (equation 10 without 
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which is also negative, implying that the U.S. trade policy should be an import subsidy policy. 
Data and Sources 
Implementation of the theoretical model to estimate the countervailing coefficient in equation 
(13) requires parameter values.  Since the ethanol market is still in its infancy stage and 
undergoing structural change, reliable econometric estimates for elasticity parameters are not 
readily available (Gardner, 2003; Elobeid and Tokgoz, 2008).  Consequently, elasticity values 
used by the past studies are utilized to estimate the value for  .  This approach is taken because 
earlier studies have used these elasticity values to obtain credible results in their analyses 
(Elobeid and Tokgoz, 2008; de Gorter, Just, and Tan, 2009).   
φ10 
 
Table 1 reports values of elasticity parameters and their sources, which were obtained 
from extensive search of the agricultural economics and energy literature pertinent to the U.S., 
Brazilian, and ROW oil and ethanol markets.  The own-price demand elasticity for fuel, ethanol, 
and gasoline are generally inelastic.  The supply elasticities for gasoline in the United States and 
for ethanol in Brazil are also inelastic.  However, the supply elasticity of gasoline in the ROW is 
elastic because it is based on OPEC countries’ supply response as reported by de Gorter, Just, 
and Tan (2009).  The blend ratio m is determined by the RFS regulations, and the current ethanol 
blend in gasoline is 10%. 
Estimation of the countervailing coefficient φalso requires, as evident from equation 
(13), supply, demand, and price data.  Ethanol and gasoline consumption and production data 
were obtained from the Online International Energy Statistics Database of the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) (2009c); Country Analysis Briefs: Brazil Energy Data 
Statistics and Analysis of the EIA (2009b); Monthly Energy Review, September 2009 EIA 
(2009d); the Plano Decenal de Expansao de Energia 2008/2017 – Capitulo VIII (in Portuguese) 
of the Empresa de Pesquisa Energetica (EPE) em estreita vinculacao com o Ministerio de Minas 
e Energia (MME); the Anuário Estatístico Brasileiro do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis 
2009 (in Portuguese) of the Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis 
(ANP) (2009); and the World Oil Outlook 2009 of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) (2009). 
Ethanol and gasoline retail and wholesale price data were obtained from the Online 
International Energy Statistics Database of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
(2009c); the Annual Energy Review 2008 of the EIA (2009a); the Monthly Energy Review of 
the of the EIA (2009d); the Energy Prices & Taxes 2
nd Quarter  2009 of the International Energy 11 
 
Agency (IEA) (2009); the Ethanol and Unleaded Gasoline Average Rack Prices F.O.B., Omaha, 
Nebraska, 1882-2009 of the Nebraska Ethanol Board (2009); the Brazil Biofuel Annual Ethanol 
Report 2009 of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) (2009); and the Anuário Estatístico 
Brasileiro do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis 2009 (in Portuguese) of the Agência 
Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (ANP) (2009). 
Results and Discussions 
The value of the countervailing coefficient for the year 2008 was computed by substituting the 
values for elasticities, mandate, consumption, production, and retail and wholesale prices in 
equation (13).  The year 2008 was chosen because that was the year the mandate was first 
implemented.  Once   is determined, the appropriate value of the import tariff is calculated by 
multiplying φwith the tax credit as per equation (11).  The computed value of   is -0.19, and the 
negative value of , φ as ascertained in the theoretical analysis, implies that the tariff is negative, 
i.e., it is an import subsidy.  For 2008, the tax credit was $0.46, which translates into an import 
subsidy of $0.09 ($0.46* (-0.19) = -$0.09; this negative import tariff amounts to a positive import 
subsidy of $0.09).  This means that every gallon of ethanol imported by the United States from 
Brazil should receive a subsidy of $0.09, rather than the currently imposed import tariff of $0.57.  
In 2008, the United States imported 434 million gallons of ethanol from Brazil (The Brazilian 
Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA), 2009).  These imports availed the tax credit of $0.46 
per gallon but incurred the tariff of $0.57 per gallon.  As a result, the United States paid $199.6 
million in tax credits but generated $247.4 million in tariff revenues from the imports of 
Brazilian ethanol.  The net value of $47.8 million is a gain to the United States but a loss to 




subsidizing the ethanol imports from Brazil to the tune of $39.1 million (434 million gallons 
times the per unit import subsidy of $0.09).   
The results of this analysis are consistent with the findings of the previous studies.  de 
Gorter and Just (2008) find that Brazil benefits from U.S. free market policies but incurs loss 
with a tax credit and import tariff.  They also note that the U.S. argument that an import tariff is 
needed to offset the tax credit, otherwise the U.S. ethanol industry would be harmed, is 
unfounded.  Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) observe that removing the U.S. ethanol import tariff 
without modifying the tax credit should increase ethanol imports and lower U.S. ethanol prices.  
Furthermore, the removal of both policies should decrease U.S. ethanol prices and production, 
increase consumption, and increase imports by almost 200%.  Brazilian ethanol production and 
exports are predicted to increase to satisfy the U.S. demand.  de Gorter, Just, and Tan (2009) 
conclude that a reduction of the U.S. ethanol import tariff on a level lower than the tax credit 
would increase and stimulate ethanol trade, which implies that the United States should be 
subsidizing the ethanol imports as supported by our study.     
Sugarcane in Brazil is a low-cost input for ethanol production, which can compete on a 
production cost basis with gasoline even without subsidies.  Sugar ethanol in Brazil costs only 
$2.62 per gallon in 2008; in contrast, corn ethanol in the United States costs $3.44.  In addition, 
sugar ethanol offers higher energy benefits than corn ethanol energy (Rajagopal and Zilberman, 
2007).  Furthermore, Brazilian ethanol is competitive between $29.00 and $35.00 per barrel of 
crude oil, but U.S. ethanol is competitive only between $44.00 and $50.00 per barrel of crude oil 
(Motaal, 2008; Von Lampe, 2006).  Consequently, Brazil has a comparative advantage in 
producing ethanol from sugarcane and is competitive in spite of high U.S. import tariff.  These 
findings support the view that the U.S. ethanol import tariff is designed to protect U.S. biofuel 13 
 
producers and corn farmers who cannot produce the ethanol as cost effectively as the Brazilian 
sugarcane growers.   
To examine the influence of various parameter values on the countervailing coefficient 
and thus on import subsidy, we conduct sensitivity analyses by letting the values of elasticities to 
range from very inelastic to elastic and the mandate to range from 0 to 1.  We present the 
empirical results in Table 2 and the comparative static results of the theoretical analysis in the 
appendix.  The value of the countervailing coefficient is not overly sensitive to U.S. gasoline 
supply elasticity, and ROW gasoline supply and demand elasticities.  For example, as these 
elasticities become elastic, the value ofφconverges to -0.21 which is very close to theφvalue of  
-0.19 obtained from the benchmark elasticities given in Table 1.  When U.S. gasoline supply 
elasticity and ROW gasoline demand elasticity are very inelastic, theφvalue is -0.19, which is 
identical to theφvalue for the benchmark elasticities, which implies that for a given tax credit, 
the import subsidy does not change much.  As the ROW gasoline supply elasticity becomes 
inelastic, theφvalue approaches -0.08. 
As the Brazilian ethanol supply and demand elasticities become very elastic, the value of 
φapproaches 0.  The reason for this result is the elastic Brazilian supply and demand make the 
excess supply also very elastic and when the United States faces an elastic excess supply it 
operates as a small country and its policies have no effect on Brazil.  Thus, the Brazilian price is 
not impacted, and the ethanol imports from Brazil do not need any import subsidy.  As the 
Brazilian ethanol demand elasticity becomes inelastic, it does not have a significant impact on 
theφvalue.  This is because the excess supply elasticity reflects the Brazilian domestic supply 
elasticity, and thus theφvalue is similar to the results obtained for the benchmark Brazilian 
supply elasticity.  However, an inelastic Brazilian supply has a larger effect on φbecause the 14 
 
excess supply also becomes inelastic and the U. S. policies depress the Brazilian price 
significantly.  Consequently, to increase the Brazilian price, the United States needs to give a 
large import subsidy; thus, theφvalue is a large negative. 
As the U.S. demand elasticity for fuel becomes more elastic, the   coefficient tends to a 
large negative.  The rationale for this result is that the U. S. excess demand for gasoline and 
ethanol also becomes very elastic, which makes Brazil a small exporting country in the ethanol 
market.  Consequently, Brazil bears the full effect of U.S. ethanol policy changes, which means 
the tariff needs to decline and become a large negative for the U.S. ethanol price to reach the free 
market price.  If U.S. fuel demand elasticity is very inelastic, then   tends to zero.  This result 
implies that irrespective of the magnitude of the tax credit, the tariff/import subsidy will be close 
to zero, and U.S. ethanol policies do not have any bearing on the import tariff.  
If m is close to zero, the role of the mandate is less important because the ethanol is not a 
significant component of the fuel market, and the U.S. will not be a major player in the world 
ethanol market.  In this case, the value of   is close to zero, which indicates that for a given tax 
credit, the import subsidy would also be near zero.  In contrast, as m increases (i.e.,  1 m → ), the 
ethanol market becomes large relative to the gasoline market, and the United States will be an 
even larger player in the world ethanol market.  As a result, U.S. policies will have a greater 
impact on the world ethanol market, which implies, for a given tax credit, the ethanol import 
subsidy will increase as m rises to maintain the free-market policy U.S. domestic ethanol price.  
  The φvalue for the ethanol market in isolation computed using equation (14) is -1.14, 
and the corresponding import subsidy is $0.52.  The import subsidy is larger if only the ethanol 







The United States and Brazil are currently the two largest biofuel producers in the world.  The 
U.S. goals are to become energy independent and reduce carbon emission.  However, studies 
have shown that the U.S. biofuel policies do more to increase farm income from corn production 
than to reduce GHG emissions.  For instance, Miranowski (2007) concludes that even with the 
farm supports, the U.S. corn-ethanol production would have never been feasible without biofuel 
subsidies.  In contrast, Brazil has a comparative advantage in producing sugar-based ethanol, 
which is more energy efficient and eco-friendly than corn-based ethanol (Kojima, Mitchell, and 
Ward, 2007).  Furthermore, sugar-based ethanol can directly compete with gasoline without 
subsidies as a renewable energy alternative.  Nevertheless, U.S. trade barriers restrict 
environmentally beneficial sugar-based ethanol.  Therefore, the U.S. import tariff contradicts its 
goal of less reliance on imported petroleum and environmental improvements through reductions 
in GHG emissions (Johnson and Runge, 2007).  Though the U.S. corn-based ethanol is promoted 
as a clean alternative for fossil fuel, recent research exposed possible negative environmental 
impacts as well as the rise in food prices (Searchinger et al. 2008; Escobar et al. 2009).  These 
factors breed doubts as to the feasibility of U.S. corn ethanol. 
Our study provides evidence that the current U.S. ethanol import tariff in excess of the 
tax credit is unjustifiable, and the United States should be providing an import subsidy.  
Furthermore, global emissions will decline if there is a freer trade in ethanol due to Brazil’s 
comparative advantage in producing energy efficient and environmentally beneficial sugar 
ethanol (de Gorter, Just, and Tan, 2009).  In addition, elimination of U.S. import tariff should 
increase competition and bring innovation in efficiency and production to the global ethanol 16 
 
industry.  The United States should focus on increasing investments and gaining a comparative 
advantage in the “next generation” biofuel production. 17 
 
Endnote 
 1 Brazil does not currently subsidize its sugar-based ethanol, even though it did provide 
government support at the infancy stage of the ethanol industry (van den Wall Bake et al., 2008). 
   
 2 Since tax credit is given to domestic production and imports, and thus does not discriminate 
against imports, it does not violate the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (de Gorter and Just, 2008). 
3See de Gorter and Just (2008) and de Gorter and Just (2009) for a model that incorporates U.S. 
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Table 1.  Elasticity Values and Sources 
Definitions  Parameters  Elasticity 
Values  Sources 
Demand Elasticities       
   U.S. own-price elasticity of fuel   U
FF η   -0.8  Gallagher et al., 
2003. 
   Brazilian own-price elasticity of   
   ethanol  
B
EE η   -0.10  Elobeid and 
Tokgoz, 2008. 
   ROW own-price elasticity of  
   gasoline 
R
GG η   -0.205  Eltony and Al-
Mutairi, 1995. 
U.S. own-price elasticity of ethanol  U
EE η  




     
   U.S. own-price elasticity of fuel   U
GG ε   0.15  Elobeid and 
Tokgoz, 2008. 
   Brazilian own-price elasticity of  
   ethanol  
B
EE ε   0.2  Gallagher et al., 
2003. 
   ROW own-price elasticity of  
   gasoline 
R
GG ε   2.25  de Gorter et al., 
2009. 26 
 







GG ε   0.01  -0.19 
10  -0.21 
R
GG η   -0.01  -0.19 
-10  -0.21 
R
GG ε   0.01  -0.08 
10  -0.21 
B
EE ε   0.01  -0.85 
10  -0.00 
B
EE η   -0.01  -0.22 
-10  -0.01 
U
FF η   -0.01  -0.00 
-10  -0.85 
m  0  -0.00 
1  -2.21 
 
 